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Abstract:	
	
The	 decline	 of	 industry	 in	 Southern	 Africa	 has	 prompted	 James	 Ferguson	 to	 question	 the	 bases	 on	
which	the	region’s	poor	may	justify	claims	on	resources,	if	not	through	their	labour.	This	article	builds	
from	Fergsuon’s	work	by	looking	at	the	continuing	importance	of	chieftaincy	to	distributive	politics	in	
Malawi.	 I	 use	 a	 case	 study	 of	 a	 government	 agricultural	 extension	 programme	 in	 a	 village	 in	 rural	
Malawi	 to	 show	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 opportunities	 its	 chiefs	 and	 its	 people	 have	 had	 to	 make	
‘declarations	of	dependence’	have	waxed	and	waned	over	time.	In	the	context	of	the	longue	durée,	the	
programme	appears	as	the	latest	in	a	series	of	interventions	that	have	created	opportunities	for	chiefs	
and	people	to	make	new	relationships,	and	to	remake	old	ones.	I	use	the	case	to	suggest	how	migrant	
labour,	old	agricultural	extension	programmes,	and	changes	to	the	status	of	chiefs	within	the	Malawian	
state	have	structured	the	way	in	which	chiefs	have	been	able	to	operate	in	Malawi.	Based	on	the	case	
study,	and	other	research	on	chiefs	 in	Malawi,	 I	argue	that	at	the	contemporary	moment	chieftaincy	
may	stave	off	what	Ferguson	labels	‘asocial	inequality’,	but	achieves	little	more.		
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1 Introduction	
In	this	article	I	use	a	case	study	of	an	agricultural	extension	programme	to	explore	the	claims	that	
are	 made	 through	 chieftaincy	 in	 Malawi	 and	 the	 implications	 the	 institution	 has	 for	 social	 and	
economic	 inequality	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 Malawi	 government’s	 Farm	 Input	 Subsidy	 Programme	
(FISP),	 introduced	 in	 2005,	 was	 designed	 to	 boost	 the	 agricultural	 productivity	 of	 the	 country’s	
poorest	farmers	in	order	that	they	might	be	better	able	to	produce	crops	for	sale	and	for	their	own	
subsistence	 (Chirwa	 and	Dorward	2013,	Holden	 and	 Lunduka	2013,	 Eggen	2012,	 Chinsinga	 2010).	
The	logic	of	the	FISP	was	however	envisaged	differently	in	the	village	of	Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	where	
I	did	ethnographic	 fieldwork	over	2012	and	2013.	People	there	made	claims	on	FISP	resources	on	
the	basis	of	 their	connection	to	 their	Village	Head,	as	much	as	on	their	 relative	ability	 to	produce	
crops.	While	resources	were	not	concentrated	with	the	poorest	people	in	the	village,	neither	were	
they	without	 the	ability	 to	 influence	their	distribution.	 I	argue	that	 the	way	the	FISP	 fertiliser	was	
distributed	 in	 the	 village	 suggests	 that	 the	 institution	 of	 chieftaincy	 can	 prevent	 inequality	
developing	in	contemporary	Malawi,	but	only	amongst	those	who	are	already	extremely	poor.		
	
By	 considering	 chieftaincy	 I	 attempt	 to	 meet	 James	 Ferguson’s	 call	 for	 researchers	 working	 in	
Southern	Africa	to	keep	their	‘ears	to	the	ground’	in	order	that	they	might	understand	the	different	
claims	people	make	for	the	distribution	of	wealth	in	the	region	in	the	contemporary	period	(2015	p.	
164	also	see	2013).	The	background	to	Ferguson’s	call	are	the	global	socio-economic	changes	that	
he	argues	are	leading	to	the	abjection	of	many	of	Southern	Africa’s	poorest	people	(Ferguson	2015,	
1999).	Liberalisation	and	technological	change	have	combined	to	disconnect	hundreds	of	thousands	
of	people	from	employment	in	the	region’s	industrial	centres.	At	the	same	time	land	appropriation	
and	degradation	means	that	a	return	to	subsistence	farming	is	no	longer	a	viable	option	for	most.	
While	 admitting	 that	 historic	 labour	 regimes	 maintained	 and	 proliferated	 significant	 social	
inequality,	 Ferguson	 suggests	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 ‘asocial’	 inequality	 that	 has	 developed	 in	 Southern	
Africa	in	recent	decades	is	even	more	troubling	(2015	p.	156-157).	Rather	than	being	incorporated	
into	 the	 economy	 on	 deleterious	 terms	 the	 poor	 are	 threatened	with	 being	 cast	 off	 completely,	
‘irrelevant	to	capital’	(Li	2009	p.	73).		
	
Clearing	the	ground	for	the	argument	he	makes	about	the	emergence	of	a	new	distributive	politics	
based	on	‘rightful	shares’	for	citizens,	Ferguson	emphasises	the	importance	of	the	state	relative	to	
chiefs	 in	contemporary	Southern	Africa.	 ‘Today,	clearly,	we	are	less	concerned	than	we	once	were	
with	 hereditary	 chiefs	 and	 piles	 of	 yams	 and	 more	 concerned	 with	 such	 things	 as	 state	
bureaucracies,	 taxation,	 and	 programs	 of	 social	 protection…’	 (Ferguson	 2015	 p.	 90).	 However,	
Ferguson	also	acknowledges	the	fact	that	the	rise	of	labour	during	the	colonial	period	did	not	simply	
mean	that	old	justifications	for	claims	to	resources	lost	moral	traction,	or	have	not	been	important	
to	 distributive	 politics	 as	 work	 membership	 has	 declined	 (2015	 p.	 141-151,	 2013).	 People	 have	
continued	to	have	value	beyond	their	capacity	as	labourers,	as	kin	and	as	members	of	polities	under	
chiefs.	This	article	develops	this	line	of	argument	in	Ferguson’s	work.		
	
Studying	the	state	and	state	development	and	welfare	programmes	in	Malawi	necessarily	requires	
studying	 chiefs.	 In	 Malawi	 chiefs	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 British	 colonial	 government	 under	
indirect	 rule	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘traditional	 leaders’	 within	 the	 state	 has,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	
continued	to	be	asserted	ever	since	(McCracken	2012	p.	222-223,	Eggen	2011).	At	the	time	I	did	my	
fieldwork	a	hierarchy	of	 traditional	authority	 linked	 ‘Village	Heads’,	 chiefs	over	as	 few	as	a	dozen	
adults,	 to	 ‘Group	Village	Heads’,	 to	 ‘Traditional	 Authorities’	 and	 to	 ‘Paramount	 Chiefs’,	 the	 latter	
having	authority	over	tens	of	thousands	of	people	or	more.	Amongst	other	activities,	the	literature	
on	 chiefs	 in	 Malawi	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 they,	 as	 much	 as	 bureaucrats	 and	 officials,	 who	 broker	
government	 development	 and	 welfare	 programmes	 like	 the	 FISP	 (Swidler	 2013,	 Englund	 2012,	
Eggen	2012,	2011,	Cammack	et	al	2009).		
	
The	 case	 of	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 suggests	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 influence	 chiefs	 have	 over	
distribution	 in	Malawi,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 institution	 limits	 or	 proliferates	 inequality.	 I	
draw	out	 two	ways	 in	which	 the	 distribution	 of	 FISP	was	 justified	morally	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	
village.	 Firstly,	 village	members	made	 strong	 assertions	 that	 each	household	 in	 the	 village	 should	
receive	at	least	some	FISP	fertiliser.	Simply	belonging	to	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	was	a	basis	for	
claims	for	a	share	of	the	resources	that	the	Village	Head	received	from	central	government,	through	
the	Traditional	Authority	and	Group	Village	Head	above	him.	The	claim	hardly	constituted	a	share	
based	on	citizenship	of	the	state,	but	neither	was	it	based	on	labour,	or	‘work	membership’,	to	use	
Ferguson’s	 term.	 Secondly	 the	 distributional	 ‘work’	 (nchito)	 that	 the	 village	 chief	 and	 other	
members	 of	 the	 village	 did	 was	 acknowledged	 through	 the	 distribution.	 Ferguson	 writes	 of	 the	
‘labour	 of	 distribution’,	 that	 making	 and	 mediating	 dependencies	 is	 a	 vital	 part	 of	 social	 and	
economic	life	in	Southern	Africa,	especially	as	‘productive’	labour	becomes	harder	to	obtain	(2015	p.	
94-101).	My	evidence	indicates	that	Malawians	recognise	that	this	kind	of	distributional	work	can	be	
time	consuming	and	hard,	and	that	as	such	chiefs,	who	undertake	a	lot	of	it,	may	often	be	justified	
in	taking	a	greater	share	of	resources	like	those	available	on	the	FISP.	
	
Unsurprisingly	though,	the	moral	claims	made	through	the	FISP	were	not	uncontested	in	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo.	As	well	as	highlighting	the	importance	of	certain	kinds	of	moral	appeals,	I	also	try	to	make	
sense	of	the	sanctions	that	both	chiefs	and	their	people	may	turn	to	in	order	to	press	their	claims.	
Mahmood	 Mamdani’s	 (1996)	 proposed	 that	 colonial	 powers	 turned	 chiefs	 into	 ‘decentralised	
despots’.	 Dependent	 on	 support	 from	 the	 colonial	 administration	 ‘above’	 and	 not	 their	 people	
‘below’,	chiefs	could	enrich	themselves	at	their	people’s	expense.	While	‘despotism’	is	too	strong	a	
word	to	use	to	characterize	chieftaincy	in	Malawi	in	general	(Swidler,	2013	p.	324,	McCracken,	2012	
p.	225,	Englund,	2012	p.	75,	Eggen,	2011	p.	317),	it	is	true	that	the	position	of	chiefs	of	all	seniorities	
rests	as	much	on	the	relationships	they	have	with	others,	as	it	does	on	the	relationships	they	have	
with	 their	 people.	 I	 suggest	 that	 chiefs’	 relative	 ability	 to	 exert	 influence	 turns	 around	 the	
availability	 of	 these	 relationships	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 with	 which	 chiefs	 mediate	 them.	Where	
chiefs	are	able	to	depend	on	chiefs	above	them	in	Malawi’s	chiefly	hierarchy,	or	on	the	President	
and	 members	 Malawi’s	 central	 government,	 or	 even	 on	 a	 salaried	 job,	 the	 nature	 of	 their	
dependence	on	their	people	changes.	Equally,	where	their	people	cannot	make	other	‘declarations	
of	dependence’	 (Ferguson	2015	p.	146)	 themselves,	outside	of	 the	 institution	of	 chieftaincy,	 then	
they	will	be	less	able	to	press	claims	with	their	chiefs.		
	
Setting	 the	case	of	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	 in	historical	 context,	 I	 am	able	 to	 show	the	way	 in	
which	 the	opportunities	 its	people	and	 its	chiefs	have	 to	make	 ‘declarations	of	dependence’	have	
waxed	and	waned	over	time.	 In	this	 longue	durée,	 the	Farm	Input	Subsidy	Programme	appears	as	
the	latest	in	a	series	of	interventions	that	have	created	opportunities	for	chiefs	and	people	to	make	
new	 relationships,	 and	 to	 remake	 old	 ones.	 These	 interventions	 have	 not	 simply	 supplanted	 one	
another,	but	have	 ‘layered	up’	 in	the	social	 landscape	of	the	village	and	the	surrounds,	shaped	by	
those	that	have	gone	before	them	(Jones	2009	p.	26).	I	use	the	case	to	suggest	how	migrant	labour,	
old	 agricultural	 extension	 programmes,	 and	 changes	 to	 the	 status	 of	 chiefs	 within	 the	Malawian	
state	in	the	past	structure	the	way	in	which	to	which	chiefs	operate	in	Malawi	in	the	contemporary	
period.	 Based	 on	 the	 case	 study,	 and	 other	 research	 on	 chiefs	 and	 FISP	 in	Malawi,	 I	 argue	 that	
chieftaincy	may	stave	off	‘asocial	inequality’	and	prevent	people	from	being	cast	off	completely,	but	
achieves	little	more.		
	
Long-term	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 in	 the	 Central	 Region	 of	Malawi	
inspired	 the	 focus	 on	 chiefs	 in	 this	 article.	 I	 spent	 over	 fifteen	 months	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	
between	 2012	 and	 2013,	 a	 period	 that	 covered	 one	 complete	 cycle	 of	 the	 Farm	 Input	 Subsidy	
Programme.	 I	 lived	 with	 a	 family	 during	 that	 time,	 learning	 the	 local	 language,	 Chichewa,	 and	
participating	 in	 the	daily	 life	of	 the	 village.	On	my	arrival	 I	 had	only	 general	questions	 to	 ask	 and	
largely	engaged	in	conversation	with	people	as	they	went	about	what	they	were	doing,	rather	than	
undertaking	more	 structured	 forms	 of	 interview.	 As	 Katy	 Gardner	writes,	 this	 kind	 of	 participant	
observation,	 ‘rarely	 feels	 like	 ‘proper’	 research…	[but]	 is,	however,	 the	only	way	 that	 the	detailed	
contexts	of	peoples’	 lives	and	 the	ways	 that	 these	unfold	can	be	understood’	 (2012	p.	11).	 In	 the	
case	of	this	article	it	became	apparent	during	my	time	in	the	village	that	FISP	was	perhaps	not	best	
understood	as	a	targeted	programme	to	boost	productive	capacity	of	the	poor,	but	something	that	
played	into	social	and	economic	relations	in	the	village	in	quite	a	different	way.		
	
	
		
2 The	hard	work	of	dependence	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	
While	 the	 focus	of	 this	article	 is	on	chieftaincy,	 in	 this	section	 I	briefly	highlight	 the	other	ways	 in	
which	people	 in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	 justified	claims	to	resources,	as	 I	 introduce	village.	The	other	
options	 they	 had	 to	 make	 claims	 are	 important	 to	 grasp	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 relative	
significance	of	chieftaincy	as	a	source	of	support.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	while	people	in	
the	village	farmed,	only	a	couple	of	households	were	able	to	grow	enough	food	to	last	them	through	
the	year.	Numerous	studies	have	shown	that	while	80	per	cent	of	Malawi’s	rural	population	engages	
in	farming	relatively	few	are	able	to	subsist,	let	alone	profit,	from	farming	activities	alone	(Verheijen	
2013,	Bryceson	2006	p.	173,	Ellis	2003,	Englund	1999).	Given	the	difficulties	involved	in	farming	for	
subsistence	 in	 the	 village	 and	 in	Malawi	 as	 a	whole,	 Ferguson’s	 question	 about	 how	 the	 poor	 of	
Southern	Africa	 justify	claims	 to	 resources	 is	not	 irrelevant	 to	ask	of	 the	country.	While	 they	may	
have	land,	the	difficulties	of	making	that	land	productive	leave	Malawian	farmers,	in	one	sense,	in	a	
similar	position	to	poor	Malawians	who	do	not	farm	at	all.		
	
In	the	rural	Central	Region	of	Malawi,	where	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	is	located,	the	household	or	
nuclear	 family	 is	 the	 main	 unit	 of	 production	 and	 consumption	 (Bryceson	 2006,	 Englund	 1999).	
Agricultural	work	within	households	in	the	village	was	gendered,	although	not	exclusively	so;	wives	
mostly	worked	cultivating	maize,	the	staple	crop,	while	their	husbands	took	most	responsibility	for	
cash	 crops,	 and	 tobacco	 in	particular.	 Tobacco	was	 the	most	 important	 cash	 crop	by	 value	 in	 the	
area;	each	household	that	cultivated	tobacco	grew	enough	to	make	one	‘bale’,	a	quantity	that	sold	
for	around	MK100,000	(USD	300)	in	2013.	Farming	tobacco	was	time	consuming	and	required	lots	of	
fertiliser,	so	only	men	from	a	few	households	in	the	village	cultivated	it.	All	of	the	households	in	the	
village	 that	 farmed	 grew	 groundnuts	 for	 sale,	which	 required	 far	 less	 fertilizer	 than	 tobacco,	 but	
which	 also	 sold	 for	much	 less	money.	 All	 these	 crops	were	 cultivated	 in	Malawi’s	 single	 growing	
season,	which	runs	from	late	November	or	early	December	through	to	May.		
	
As	is	the	case	across	rural	Malawi,	the	members	of	most	households	in	the	village	undertook	various	
kinds	of	work	aside	from	farming	(Verheijen	2013,	Bryceson	2006,	Ellis	2003).	Like	their	farming,	this	
work	was	also	gendered.	Men	did	piecework	away	from	the	village	while	women	mostly	remained	
in	 the	 village	 and	 did	 piecework	 there,	 as	 well	 as	 brewing	 beer	 and	 engaging	 in	 other	 business	
activities.	 Rates	 for	 piecework	 varied,	 but	 a	 day’s	 labour	making	 ridges	 in	 a	 field	 near	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	could	earn	a	pieceworker	up	to	MK	1000	(3	USD).	By	way	of	comparison,	one	man	from	the	
village	who	worked	for	Chinese	contractors	 in	Lilongwe	for	a	couple	of	months	earned	MK	15,000	
(46	 USD).	 As	 critics	 have	 pointed	 out,	 the	 ongoing	 importance	 of	 such	 work	 casts	 doubt	 on	
Ferguson’s	 thesis	 that	 poverty	 in	 contemporary	Malawi	 should	 be	blamed	on	disconnection	 from	
the	 labour	market	 (Meagher,	Mann	and	Bolt	2016).	The	crucial	point	 is	agreed	 though	 is	 that	 the	
kinds	of	labour	that	people	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	did	could	not	be	depended	upon	in	the	same	way	
as	the	kinds	of	work	that	had	been	available	in	the	past.	
	
The	overall	division	of	work	within	the	household	meant	that	husbands	normally	held	more	money	
than	their	wives,	and	the	provision	of	the	former	for	the	latter	was	a	common	theme	of	discussion	
in	 the	village	and	around	 it1.	Debates	about	 the	appropriate	distribution	of	 resources	beyond	 the	
household	or	nuclear	family	also	took	place	regularly.	An	extended	kinship	system	most	accurately	
described	as	‘cognatic’	meant	that	claims	based	on	a	wide	variety	of	relationships	could	however	be	
made	and	received	by	its	households	(Englund	2002	p.	55-56).	Many	of	these	claims	were	for	help	
(thandizo),	which	did	not	require	immediate	or	equivalent	reciprocation	and	were	normally	met	in	
the	 form	of	maize.	 People	 also	 offered	 ‘help’	 (thandizo)	 in	 the	 form	of	 their	 labour.	 These	 offers	
however,	 like	 requests	 made	 for	 help	 of	 the	 former	 variety,	 were	 frequently	 perceived	 as	
illegitimate	by	those	who	received	them	and	described	as	‘begging’	(kupempha).	As	Davison	(1993)	
describes	 having	 been	 the	 case	 in	 Southern	 Malawi,	 households	 often	 preferred	 to	 pay	
pieceworkers	on	 formal	 terms,	 in	cash,	 rather	 than	 leave	themselves	to	 face	more	open	claims	to	
																																								 																				
1	For	a	discussion	of	contemporary	gender	relations	in	rural	Malawi	see	Janneke	Verheijen’s	book	on	Southern	
Malawi	(2013).	My	main	concern	is	the	politics	of	the	inter-household	distribution	of	the	FISP	fertiliser,	but	
Verheijen’s	work	provides	insights	into	debates	about	the	intra-household	distribution	of	resources,	and	
particularly	that	between	women	and	men.		
reciprocity	 from	 relatives	 who	 had	 helped	 them	 with	 agricultural	 labour.	 As	 in	 other	 parts	 of	
Malawi,	paying	a	pieceworker	in	cash	did	not	however	always	symbolize	a	marketized	relationship	
between	the	pieceworker	and	employer	(Englund	1999,	also	see	Verheijen	2013	p.	236-238).		
	
It	was	the	relatively	wealthy	households	that	gave	the	most	piecework	and	help	to	other	members	
of	 the	village.	Of	 the	 fourteen	households	 that	made	up	Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	 two	were	generally	
regarded	as	being	‘rich’	(olemera).	These	were	the	household	I	stayed	in,	headed	by	a	man	named	
David	Kaso,	and	another	headed	by	his	brother,	Harold.	The	other	households	in	the	village	were	all	
considered	 to	 be	 of	 average	 wealth	 for	 the	 area,	 including	 the	 Chief’s,	 although	 they	 were	 not	
completely	without	differentiation	amongst	themselves.	As	in	other	nearby	villages	the	households	
in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	doing	best	were	 those	 that	 still	held	capital	 that	had	been	accumulated	 in	
the	past.		
	
The	main	facet	of	‘very	poor’	(osauka	kwambiri)	households	in	the	village	was	that	they	tended	not	
to	 farm	 for	 themselves,	 and	were	 itinerant.	 They	 relied	 solely	 on	 piecework	 in	 the	 local	 area,	 or	
elsewhere	 in	Malawi,	sometimes	moving	away	from	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	for	periods	of	months	or	
even	years.	When	I	arrived	in	the	village	there	were	no	such	families	living	there.	One	man	who	had	
been	away	for	several	years	came	back	to	live	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	in	2013,	after	the	FISP	fertiliser	
had	been	distributed	 there.	Having	 gotten	married	 he	 and	his	wife	 relied	 on	 piecework	 and	help	
from	other	households	in	the	village	and	local	area	for	the	rest	of	the	time	I	was	in	the	village.	
	
It	 was	 partly	 because	 of	 requests	 for	 help	 for	 the	 very	 poor	 that	 the	 wealthiest	 households	 in	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo	and	the	surrounds	made	little	in	the	way	of	‘profit’	(phindu).	They	also	had	to	
put	much	of	the	money	they	made	in	one	year	back	into	growing	enough	maize	and	other	crops	to	
survive	 the	 following	 year.	 Like	 their	 fellow	 villagers,	 David,	 Harold	 and	 the	 members	 of	 their	
households	 still	 had	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 ‘work	 of	 dependence’	 (Ferguson	 2015	 p.	 94),	 making	 and	
meeting	claims	from	their	extended	family,	fellow	villagers	and	the	Chief.	Their	connections	to	the	
market	were	not	strong	enough	to	depend	upon	in	absence	of	support	from	the	village.		
	
Despite	 being	 poorer	 than	 David	 and	 Harold,	 connection	 to	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo2	 was	
particularly	important	to	all	the	households	in	the	village.	This	was	not	just	because	of	the	ritual	and	
ceremonial	 functions	 he	 fulfilled	 as	 a	 chief	 (Swidler	 2013),	 but	 also	 because	 as	 Village	 Head	 he	
mediated	all	the	government	development	projects	and	programmes	that	happened	in	the	village,	
including	the	FISP.		
	
3	 The	impact	of	the	Farm	Input	Subsidy	in	theory	and	in	practice		
In	 September	 2012	 fertiliser	 and	 the	 FISP	 were	 common	 topics	 of	 conversation	 in	 Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	as	people’s	attentions	turned	to	the	planting	season.	Aside	from	piecework	and	the	sale	of	
tobacco,	 government	 and	 non-government	 development	 programmes	 were	 the	 main	 conduits	
through	which	resources	held	in	the	wider	economy	entered	the	village.	The	FISP	was	by	far	the	most	
important	of	these.	The	prospect	of	being	able	to	buy	a	bag	of	fertiliser	at	the	FISP	rate	of	MK	500	
(USD	1.50)	was	particularly	appealing	in	2012	because	of	the	huge	increase	in	the	market	price	of	the	
input	from	the	previous	year,	up	to	MK	15000	(USD	46)	from	MK	8000	(USD	25)3.	The	change	in	price	
had	led	to	people	having	to	recalculate	the	amount	of	fertiliser	they	might	be	able	to	get	on	the	open	
market.	Most	people	 felt	 they	needed	two	or	 three	bags	to	come	close	to	 farming	enough	food	to	
meet	 the	 subsistence	 requirements	 of	 their	 families.	 Those	 farmers	 intending	 to	 farm	 tobacco	
required	much	more.			
	
																																								 																				
2	In	Malawi	the	village	chief	takes	the	name	of	their	village.	Ann	Swidler	writes	this	reflects	the	way	that	chiefs	
embody	the	community	in	their	person	(2013	p.	325).	The	case	of	FISP	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	shows	that	this	
connection	could	not	however	be	taken	for	granted	and	had	to	be	worked	for.		
3	 In	an	attempt	to	stabilise	 the	national	economy	following	 its	dramatic	decline	 in	 the	 last	years	of	Bingu	wa	
Mutharika’s	presidency,	the	government	of	Joyce	Banda	devalued	the	kwacha	by	33%	in	May	2012	(BBC	2012).	
This	move,	and	subsequent	inflation,	was	responsible	for	the	dramatic	change	in	the	cost	of	fertiliser.		
		
Chirwa	and	Dorward	(2013)	outline	the	official	logic	for	the	distribution	of	subsidised	fertiliser	under	
the	FISP	in	their	detailed	study	of	the	programme.	Upwards	of	fifty	per	cent	of	Malawi’s	population	
are	meant	to	receive	support	in	the	form	of	subsidised	fertiliser	and	seed	varieties	under	the	FISP.	In	
the	 iterations	 of	 the	 programme	 that	 existed	 in	 the	 years	 immediately	 prior	 to	 2012	Ministry	 of	
Agriculture	 and	 Food	 Security	 staff,	 chiefs	 and	 village	 members	 are	 meant	 to	 identify	 a	 village’s	
neediest	 households	 at	 ‘open	 meetings’,	 following	 the	 village’s	 registration	 for	 the	 programme	
(Chirwa	and	Dorward,	2013	p.	105-106).	 It	 is	these	households	that	receive	coupons	that	they	then	
exchange,	with	the	requisite	payment,	for	fertiliser.	Each	complete	coupon	is	made	up	of	a	voucher	
for	NPK	fertiliser,	and	a	voucher	for	Urea	fertiliser4.	To	redeem	both	NPK	and	Urea	a	MK	1000	(3	USD)	
payment	is	required	on	presentation	of	the	coupon,	MK	500	(1.50	USD)	each	for	a	50	kilogramme	bag	
of	Urea	and	a	50	kilogramme	bag	of	NPK.	The	official	rationale	of	the	programme	at	the	time	I	was	
living	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 was	 that	 by	 targeting	 poorer	 farmers,	 it	 would	 improve	 their	
ability	 to	 produce	 crops,	 both	 for	 their	 own	 subsistence,	 and	 for	 sale	 on	 the	market	 (Chirwa	 and	
Dorward	 2013).	 In	 the	 programme	 the	 person’s	 value	 is	 in	 this	 way	 defined	 by	 their	 ability	 to	
produce.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 in	 analysis	 the	 FISP	 is	 categorised	 as	 a	 traditional	 ‘productivity	
enhancing’	development	programme,	rather	than	a	universal	or	unconditional	one,	of	the	kind	that	
Ferguson	analyses	(Ellis	and	Maliro	2013,	Ellis	2012,	Devereux	and	Macauslan	2006).	
	
Evidence	from	across	Malawi	suggests	however	that	chiefs	have	in	fact	had	‘substaintial	autonomy’	
to	direct	fertiliser	as	they	wish	(Holden	and	Lunduka,	2013	p.	6,	also	see	Chirwa	and	Dorward	2013	p.	
105,	Verheijen	2013	p.	233-234,	Eggen	2012	p.	9-11,	Chinsinga	2010	p.	25).	As	James	Ferguson	work	
shows,	autonomy	with	respect	to	one	relationship	tends	to	derive	from	dependence	on	another.	In	
the	 case	 of	 FISP,	 senior	 chiefs	 in	 particular	 seem	 often	 to	 have	 been	 able	 to	 depend	 on	 their	
connections	 in	 central	government,	and	 to	officials	and	bureaucrats,	 rather	 than	on	 the	chiefs	and	
village	heads	below	them	 in	 the	heirachy	of	 traditional	authority.	The	 latter	cheifs,	and	 the	people	
they	are	responsible	for,	have	little	means	to	press	claims	with	the	former	for	FISP	inputs.		
	
But	there	is	also	evidence	that	chiefs	are	not	always	able	to	distribute	FISP	fertiliser	in	a	way	that	is	at	
odds	with	 the	 interests	 of	 poor	 farmers,	 even	 if	 inputs	 are	not	 concentrated	 in	 their	 hands	 as	 the	
official	 logic	 of	 the	 programme	 dictates.	 Village	 chiefs	 seem	 to	 be	 particularly	 constrained	 in	 this	
respect.	 Eggen	 for	 example,	 writes	 that	 ‘equal	 sharing	 -	 with	 some	 tolerance	 for	 slightly	 more	
resources	 to	 the	 chief	 -	 is	 a	 norm	 firmly	 positioned	 in	 local	 discourse’	 (2012	 p.	 17).	 Harri	 Englund	
describes	people	choosing	a	new	Village	Head	for	themselves,	partly	because	of	discontent	over	the	
way	their	chief	had	been	distributing	FISP	inputs	(Englund	2012	also	see	Verheijen	2013	p.	209-210).	
While	 some	manage	 to	do	so,	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 is	often	difficult	 for	Village	Heads	 to	act	against	 the	
interests	of	their	people.			
	
People	 in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	 asserted	 the	moral	 ‘justice’	 (chilungamo)	 of	 a	 similar	distribution	 to	
that	which	Eggen	describes,	and	demonstrated	the	capacity	to	effectively	press	for	the	FISP	fertiliser	
to	be	shared	 in	 this	way.	People	 told	me	the	 fertiliser	 should	and	would	be	shared	equally,	as	one	
women	put	it	‘one,	one,	one,	one,	it	will	be	shared	one	bag	per	[household]’.	This	was	the	position	of	
the	people	 I	 talked	 to	who	 lived	 in	 surrounding	 villages	 as	well.	 To	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	 and	
other	villagers,	extent	of	 the	provision	of	 fertiliser	by	Malawi’s	Presidents	was	 the	key	measure	by	
which	 they	 were	 judged.	 President	 Bingu	 wa	 Mutharika,	 who	 had	 instituted	 the	 FISP,	 was	
remembered	 as	 a	 good	 President,	 because	 he	 had	 ‘provided	 fertiliser’.	 President	 Kamuzu	 Banda,	
Malawi’s	 first	 President	 after	 independence	 was	 similarly	 remembered	 for	 ‘caring’	 for	 the	 people	
through	his	provision	of	 fertiliser.	 I	discuss	 the	history	of	agricultural	 inputs	 later	 in	 the	article.	For	
now,	it	 is	import	only	to	emphasise	the	fact	that	people	implied	that	Malawi’s	Presidents	sat	at	the	
top	of	the	country’s	hierarchy	of	traditional	authority	and	that	in	their	claims	on	FISP	fertiliser	were	
not	 just	 based	 on	membership	 of	 the	 village	 but	 also	 the	 fact	 the	 President	 also	 had	 distributive	
responsibilities	towards	them.		
	
In	was	 by	 President,	 through	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 chiefs,	 that	 people	 in	 the	 village	 explained	 the	 FISP	
would	be	distributed.	There	was	no	meeting	with	an	agricultural	extension	agent	 in	the	village,	the	
																																								 																				
4	There	are	also	vouchers	available	for	hybrid	maize	and	legume	seed	(Chirwa	and	Dorward	2013	p.	183-193).		
work	of	mediating	the	distribution	in	the	village	falling	to	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo.	Villagers	told	me	
that	 this	 was	 how	 the	 distribution	 had	 always	 been	 handled.	 Chief	 Chitmengo	 Kubwalo	 visited	
everyone	in	the	village	to	discuss	the	FISP	over	the	course	of	October	and	November,	the	distribution	
of	the	coupons	and	their	exchange	for	fertiliser	being	expected	sometime	at	the	start	of	December.	
Many	 villagers	 also	went	 to	 Chief	 Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	 house	 to	 ask	 him	 for	 FISP	 fertiliser.	 These	
discussions	 took	 place	 while	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 was	 also	 attending	 various	 meetings	 with	
other	village	chiefs,	the	Group	Village	Heads	and	the	Traditional	Authority.	He	was	absent	from	the	
village	a	lot	of	the	time,	walking	for	several	hours	a	day,	either	to	see	the	Group	Village	Head,	or	the	
Traditional	Authority,	to	check	on	the	status	of	the	FISP	coupons.	Other	village	chiefs	joined	him.		
	
It	was	 through	 this	hierarchy	of	 chiefs	 that	villagers	explained	 that	 the	 fertiliser	 coupons	would	be	
distributed.	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 worried	 towards	 of	 the	 end	 of	 November	 that	 the	 FISP	
coupons	might	not	make	it	into	his	hands	at	all.	There	had	been	reports	on	the	radio	of	instances	of	
senior	 chiefs	 and	 government	 officials	 appropriating	 FISP	 fertiliser	 coupons	 and	 redirecting	 them	
away	 from	Village	Heads	and	 their	people	 in	other	parts	of	Malawi.	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	was	
concerned	 that	 something	 similar	might	 happen	 to	 the	 coupons	 destined	 for	 the	 area	 around	 the	
village.	 In	 the	 end	 the	 village	 was	 assigned	 twelve	 coupons,	 equivalent	 to	 twenty-four	 bags	 of	
fertiliser.	 This	 was	 the	 number	 they	 had	 been	 allocated	 the	 previous	 year,	 and	 Chief	 Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	was	reasonably	satisfied.	
	
The	fertiliser	was	not	however	spread	equally	around	the	village,	‘one,	one,	one’,	as	people	had	said	
it	 would	 be.	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 explained	 he	 would	 get	 four	 bags,	 while	 the	 three	 other	
wealthiest	households	in	the	village	also	received	more	than	the	others.	David’s	household	would	get	
three	bags,	Harold’s	four,	and	Yamikani’s	three.	Yamikani	was	the	head	of	what	was	regarded	as	the	
wealthiest	of	the	households	in	the	village,	after	David’s	and	Harold’s.	This	left	every	other	household	
with	 one	 bag	 of	 fertiliser.	When	 I	 asked	 poorer	members	 of	 the	 village	 what	 they	 felt	 about	 the	
distribution,	they	explained	that	it	was	to	be	expected	that	these	households	would	receive	more	as	
they	 were	 headed	 by	 ‘big	 men’	 (aakulu).	 The	 ‘big	 men’	 justified	 their	 shares	 as	 using	 the	 same	
reasoning.	David	pointed	out	that	he	had	the	largest	family	in	the	village,	including	several	‘orphan’	
children	whose	parents	had	died	or	moved	elsewhere,	and	had	no	one	to	care	for	them.	He,	Harold	
and	Yamikani	 said	 that	many	of	 the	villagers	 ‘depended’	 (kudalira)	on	 them	for	 food	 in	 the	hungry	
season.	Poorer	than	David,	Harold	and	Yamikani,	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	receipt	of	a	larger	share	
of	 fertiliser	was	explained	by	 virtue	of	 the	 fact	he	was	 the	 chief	of	 the	 village.	He	 told	me	he	was	
entitled	to	this	share	because	of	all	the	‘work’	(nchito)	he	had	done	organising	the	distribution,	and	
because	of	the	other	distributional	‘work’	he	did	as	village	chief	throughout	the	year.		
	
The	resignation	of	the	poorer	members	of	the	village	implied	that	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	with	the	
support	of	other	chiefs,	and	of	David,	Harold	and	Yamikani,	was	able	to	act	without	much	regard	for	
them.	When	 I	pushed	questions	about	 the	position	of	Village	Heads	 like	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	
people	agreed	that	they	‘controlled	the	fertiliser’5.		
	
However,	even	as	people	described	the	‘control’	chiefs	had	over	FISP	inputs,	they	also	implied	limits	
to	that	control.	Reflecting	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	own	assertions,	several	people	described	the	
‘hard	work’	the	Chieftiancy	involved,	and	the	lack	of	‘profit’	(phindu)	that	was	to	be	gained	from	it.	
Most	expressed	reservations	about	wanting	to	 fulfil	 the	role	themselves.	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	
himself	 complained	 that	 he	 spent	 a	 lot	 of	 time	mediating	 ‘cases’	 (milandu)6;	 ‘I	 just	 go	 around	 and	
around’	(kuyendayenda).	Stating	that	the	chieftaincy	was	a	desirable	position	could	of	course	lead	to	
troubling	 accusations	 of	 covetousness;	 modesty	 has	 tended	 to	 be	 expected	 amongst	 prospective	
chiefly	candidates	in	Malawi	(Englund	2002	p.	141).	But	not	all	of	the	reservations	people	expressed	
about	 chieftaincy	 can	 be	 put	 down	 to	 the	 fear	 of	 accusation.	 Nor	 can	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo’s	 own	
																																								 																				
5	They	also	mentioned	other	advantages	that	derived	from	the	position.	Amongst	these	benefits	was	the	
monthly	stipend	chiefs	received,	of	a	few	thousand	kwacha,	and	the	good	food	they	got	at	communal	
gatherings.			
6	This	was	the	term	used	to	describe	meetings	that	took	place	to	resolve	disputes.	Cases	were	heard	by	chiefs	
at	all	levels	of	the	hierarchy,	escalating	up	it	where	resolutions	could	not	be	agreed	at	a	certain	level.		
		
complaints	 simply	be	explained	as	 instrumental	 appeals	 for	 sympathy.	 Events	 that	 surrounded	 the	
distribution	of	 the	FISP	 fertiliser	 in	 the	village	 in	2012	served	 to	suggest	 the	 limits	of	 the	power	or	
control	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	and	other	village	chiefs	had	in	the	distribution	of	FISP.	
	
On	 our	 return	 from	 the	 depot	 where	 the	members	 of	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village	 had	 exchanged	
their	 coupons	 for	 fertiliser,	 David	 told	me	 that	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 had,	 at	 the	 last	minute,	
decided	to	take	one	of	Yamikani’s	bags	of	fertiliser	for	himself,	 leaving	Yamikani	with	only	two,	and	
the	 chief	 with	 five.	 The	 decision	 provoked	 far	 more	 comment	 and	 complaint	 than	 the	 original	
distribution,	 suggesting	moral	 limits	 around	 how	much	 wealth	 a	 chief	 might	 justifiably	 accrue	 for	
himself	and	his	own	household.	Over	the	following	days	it	became	apparent	that	no	one	in	the	village	
thought	what	 the	 chief	 had	 done	 to	 Yamikani	was	 ‘just’	 (chilungamo).	 Limbani,	 one	 of	 the	 poorer	
farmers	in	the	village	complained,	‘It	is	not	just	-	we	have	no	money’,	locating	Yamikani’s	family	with	
his	own	poorer	household,	rather	than	with	David	and	Harold’s.	David	and	Harold	also	agreed	that	
what	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	had	done	was	‘not	good’.	When	I	spoke	to	Yamikani	he	did	not	say	
much	about	what	had	happened	but	admitted	he	was	‘angry’	(kukwiya)	with	the	Chief.			
	
Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	meanwhile	told	to	me	that	Yamikani	was	just	‘causing	trouble’	and	‘being	
insolent’	 (kuchita	 chipongwe).	 But	 he	 was	 also	 anxious,	 and	 tried	 to	 get	 other	 villagers	 to	 talk	 to	
Yamikani	 on	 his	 behalf	 in	 order	 to	 ‘console’	 (kupepetsa)	 him.	 A	 few	 weeks	 later	 Chief	 Chitengo	
Kubwalo	and	Yamikani	were	on	speaking	terms	again	but	the	Chief	continued	to	worry	that	Yamikani	
might	 be	 ‘causing	 trouble’.	 He	 explained	 to	me	 that	 he	was	worried	 Yamikani	might	 be	 leading	 a	
group	of	villagers,	including	Limbani,	to	support	his	‘removal	as	chief’	(kuchotsa	amfumu).		
	
The	head	of	a	neighbouring	village,	Chief	Chimtengo	Kutsidya,	had	even	more	problems	than	Chief	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo	when	he	took	a	coupon	that	he	had	initially	allocated	to	a	woman	in	his	village.	
The	woman,	 Esnarth	Mitambo,	was	by	 local	 standards,	 ‘very	poor’	 (osauka	 kwambiri);	 she	headed	
her	household	alone	and	had	 relied	on	piecework	 to	 survive	 for	most	of	her	 life.	 In	October	Chief	
Chimtengo	 Kutsidya	 to	 hold	 her	 that	 she	 would	 receive	 FISP	 fertiliser.	 However	 the	 Chief	
subsequently	 decided	 to	 take	 a	 greater	 share	 of	 the	 village’s	 fertiliser	 for	 himself,	 by	withholding	
Esnarth’s	coupon.	She	did	not	take	this	well;	‘Kutsidya	will	cry	for	what	he	has	done’	Esnarth	insisted	
while	 talking	 to	 some	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 villagers	 and	 myself.	 With	 the	 support	 of	 some	 other	
members	of	Chimtengo	Kutsidya,	and	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	and	other	local	chiefs,	Esnarth	called	
a	‘case’	against	Chief	Chimtengo	Kutsidya	that	was	heard	by	the	Group	Village	Head.	Chief	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	 came	 back	 saying	 that	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kutsidya	 had	 been	 contrite,	 and	 ended	 up	
complaining	to	the	Group	Village	Head,	 ‘“I	do	not	want	to	be	a	chief,	 it	should	go	to	someone	else,	
take	 [the	 chieftaincy]!”’	The	 coupon	had	ended	up	back	 in	 Esnarths’s	 hands	 after	 the	hearing,	 but	
Chief	Chimtengo	Kutsidya	had	remained	head	of	the	village.		
	
These	cases	suggest	that	while	the	arrangement	of	the	FISP	did	not	mean	fertiliser	and	other	inputs	
were	 concentrated	 with	 the	 poorest	 people	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 the	 surrounding	 villages,	
neither	did	it	necessarily	mean	that	Village	Heads	could	act	without	any	regard	for	them.	Everyone	I	
talked	 to	 in	 the	 village	 had	 aspirations	 to	 ‘make	profit’,	 by	 selling	 livestock	 or	 crops,	 or	by	 getting	
decent,	salaried	employment;	they	did	not	valorise	egregious	dependence	on	kin,	fellow	villagers	or	
their	chiefs.	Yet,	given	the	weakness	and	caprice	of	the	market,	greater	dependence	on	it,	relative	to	
dependence	on	family,	fellow	villagers	and	chiefs	was	not	viable,	unless	perhaps	they	could	obtain	a	
far	greater	quantity	of	 resources	than	were	available	through	the	FISP.	 In	this	 respect	people	were	
trapped	 by	 their	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 cases	 from	 the	 2012	 FISP	
programme	suggest	that	the	actions	of	Village	Heads	could	be	sharply	delimited	by	the	actions	of	the	
members	of	 their	villages.	Even	 the	poorest	Malawians	had	some	 freedom	to	assert	 their	will,	and	
limit	inequality.	To	understand	the	extent	to	which	this	was	the	case,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	the	
programme	in	historical	context.		
	
4	 	A	history	of	dependencies		
	
The	Chewa,	the	ethnic	group	to	whom	everyone	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	belonged,	were	organised	in	
relatively	egalitarian,	non-hierarchical	polities	prior	to	the	advent	of	British	rule	in	the	late	nineteenth	
century.	Selected	and	installed	by	elders	on	the	basis	of	their	‘character’	(Marwick	1965	p.	118),	the	
Chewa	 chief’s	 position	 remained	 dependent	 upon	 the	 adequate	 fulfilment	 of	 their	 responsibilities	
towards	 their	 people,	 more	 than	 on	 hereditary	 claims.	 Where	 chiefs	 failed	 to	 meet	 these	
responsibilities,	which	included	the	distribution	of	resources,	new	villages	and	chieftaincies	‘budded	
off’	 from	 existing	 ones	 (Rangeley,	 1948	 p.	 10,	 Marwick,	 1965	 p.	 139).	 As	 Ferguson	 argues	 in	 his	
history	of	the	Southern	African	region	(2015	p.	142-146,	2013),	the	wide	and	equal	availability	of	land	
and	other	 resources	at	 the	 time	meant	 that	people	had	a	high	degree	of	 freedom	to	declare	 their	
dependence	 on	 chiefs	 of	 new	 polities,	 should	 their	 existing	 leaders	 fail	 to	 adequately	 fulfil	 their	
responsibilities	7.	
	
The	 British	 policy	 of	 indirect	 rule	 incorporated	 chiefs	 into	 the	 colonial	 administration	 (McCracken	
2012	p.	222-223,	Eggen	2011	p.	316-317).	Indirect	rule	implied	a	challenge	to	the	egalitarian	political	
arrangements	 of	 the	 Chewa,	 chiefs	 being	 able	 to	 depend	 on	 their	 connection	 to	 the	 protectorate	
administration	to	buttress	their	position	against	protest	from	their	people.	However,	even	relatively	
senior	chiefs	in	the	hierarchy	of	‘native	authorities’	the	British	established	found	there	was	relatively	
little	support	 for	them	from	the	protectorate	capital	 in	Zomba	(McCracken,	2012	p.	222-230)8.	This	
being	 the	 case,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 chiefs,	 and	particularly	Village	Heads,	 could	 ignore	or	 oppress	
their	people	as,	 in	Mamdani’s	 (1996)	oft-quoted	phrase,	 ‘decentralised	despots’,	has	been	debated	
(Swidler,	2013	p.	324,	McCracken,	2012	p.	225,	Englund,	2012	p.	75,	Eggen,	2011	p.	317).		
	
Chiefs	were	certainly	constrained	by	the	fact	that	the	colonial	economy	offered	people	-	mainly	men	
-	 an	 alternative	way	of	 accruing	wealth	 and	 status,	 away	 from	 the	 institution	of	 chieftaincy.	Many	
Chewa	 were	 amongst	 those	 James	 Ferguson	 describes	 ‘voluntarily’	 migrating	 to	 labour	 in	 the	
industrial	economies	of	Rhodesia	and	South	Africa	during	the	colonial	period	(Ferguson	2015	p.	147,	
McCracken,	2012	p.	178-188,	256-260).	At	home,	where	the	colonial	appropriation	of	land	for	estates	
and	 plantations	 was	 largely	 restricted	 to	 the	 Southern	 Region,	 many	 Chewa	 people	 were	 also	
incorporated	 into	 the	 colonial	 economy	 as	 smallholder	 producers	 of	 tobacco.	 Tobacco	 production	
was	 led	 by	 ‘Master	 Farmers’	 who,	 having	 been	 selected	 by	 colonial	 officials,	 received	 training,	
equipment	 and	 inputs	 that	 enabled	 them	 to	 become	 small-scale	 agricultural	 capitalists,	 employing	
other	people	on	their	farms	(Mapila	et	al.,	2010	p.	148,	McCracken,	2012	p.	251).	The	relationships	
that	 certain	 individuals	 were	 able	 to	 forge	 through	 migrant	 labour	 abroad,	 and	 with	 colonial	
agricultural	extension	workers	 closer	 to	home,	meant	 they	 could	press	 their	own	claims	with	 their	
Village	Heads,	despite	their	incorporation	into	the	colonial	administration.		
	
Moral	debates	about	the	just	or	rightful	distribution	of	resources	accompanied	the	structural	changes	
that	took	place	in	economy	and	society.	People	who	had	not	been	able	to	connect	directly	into	the	
colonial	economy	as	migrant	 labours	or	smallholders,	had	to	find	other	ways	to	press	claims	 in	the	
face	of	the	social	and	economic	changes	that	were	taking	place.	This	was	particularly	true	of	women	
(White	1987	p.	228-229,	Vaughan	1987	p.	123)9,	but	also	of	some	chiefs	(Marwick	1965	p.	181-182).	
These	 claims,	 based	on	non-market	 principles,	 continued	 to	matter	 to	both	migrant	 labourers	 and	
Master	 Farmers.	 McCracken	 for	 example	 notes	 relations	 of	 kinship	 and	 affect	 remained	 key	
considerations	in	Master	Farmer’s	provision	of	labour	to	pieceworkers	(2012	p.	251).	While	migrants	
used	their	status	as	labourers	to	justify	their	possession	and	use	of	their	earnings,	neither	were	they	
indifferent	to	claims	for	distribution	made	along	other	 lines	 in	their	home	villages,	 including	on	the	
basis	of	chieftaincy	(McCracken,	2012	p.	185-187,	Marwick	1965	p.	181-182).		
																																								 																				
7	Even	the	hierarchically	ordered	Ngoni	Kingdom	that	entered	and	expanded	in	the	region	through	the	early	
19th	century	splintered	rapidly	immediately	before	the	colonial	period	(Ferguson	2015	142-146,	Barnes	1967).		
8	Nyasaland	received	little	investment	from	the	British	government	relative	to	other	colonies	in	Southern	Africa	
(McCracken	2012	p.	74-99).		
9	The	gendered	aspects	of	labour	migration	from	Malawi	have	been	analysed	extensively	(White	1987,	Vaughan	
1987).	Some	women	did	migrate	(McCracken	2012	p.	184),	but	most	had	to	work	out	their	relationships	with	
migrant	husbands	and	other	male	relatives	from	the	villages	in	which	they	lived.	What	Verheijen	calls	an	
‘ideology’	of	male	provision	developed	in	Southern	Malawi,	women	using	it	to	press	their	claims	on	the	
earnings	of	husbands	(Verheijen	2013	p.	248,	White	1987	p.	228,	Vaughan	1987	p.	123).	
		
	
Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	predecessor,	Chief	Chimteno	Three,	became	a	powerful	and	wealthy	man	
through	 the	 different	 connections	 he	 was	 able	 to	 make	 and	 maintain	 through	 this	 period.	 Born	
Stanley	in	1918,	he	had	migrated	from	the	village,	at	that	time	simply	called	Chimtengo,	during	the	
1940s.	 He	 subsequently	 spent	 long	 periods	working	 in	 South	Africa	 through	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s.	
Stanley	maintained	 good	 relations	with	people	 in	 the	 village	 through	 the	provision	of	 regular	 cash	
remittances.	So	well	did	he	support	 relatives	and	other	people	at	home	that	on	the	death	of	Chief	
Chimtengo	Two,	the	elders	of	the	village	declared	him	the	new	chief	of	the	village.	This	was	despite	
the	 fact	 he	was	 still	 away	 in	 South	Africa.	 Stanley’s	 elder	 brother	 Pondani	 stood	 as	 acting	 chief	 in	
Stanley’s	place	until	he	returned	to	the	village	to	live	there	permanently	as	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	in	
1972.		
	
On	 his	 return	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 used	 his	 savings	 to	 enter	 the	 ‘Master	 Farmer’	 (Chikumbi)	
programme,	which	had	continued	to	run	after	Malawi	became	independent	in	1964.	At	that	time,	as	
during	the	colonial	era,	those	farmers	who	already	had	capital	were	favoured	for	selection	(Mapila	et	
al.	2010,	McCracken	2012	p.	251).	Villagers	 remembered	 that	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	continued	 to	
amass	wealth	 through	 farming	during	 the	1970s	 and	1980s;	 he	planted	 several	 stands	of	 trees	 for	
lumber,	bought	hundreds	of	layer	hens	and	various	kinds	of	livestock.	He	obtained	an	ox-plough	-	a	
piece	of	equipment	 rare	amongst	 smallholders	 -	 subsidised	 fertiliser	and	 loans	 through	 the	Master	
Farmer	programme.	These	allowed	him	to	farm	a	much	larger	area	than	would	otherwise	have	been	
possible.		
	
People	emphasised	the	fact	that	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	used	much	of	his	material	wealth	to	provide	
for	 people	 in	 the	 village,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 relatives	 and	 acquaintances	 living	 elsewhere.	 I	 was	 told	
piecework	had	always	been	plentiful	during	Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	chieftaincy	while	my	host	David	
Kaso	 said	 on	 several	 occasions	 that	 Chimtengo	 Three	 ‘helped	 many	 people’,	 including	 him,	 with	
things	 like	school	 fees.	 It	was	the	way	 in	which	he	had	used	his	material	wealth	to	support	others,	
building	 ‘wealth	 in	people’	 (Guyer	1993),	 that	made	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	 ‘a	very	big	man’	 in	 the	
village	and	local	area.		
	
However,	as	a	man	whose	wealth	derived	from	work	abroad,	and	through	the	inputs	and	equipment	
he	received	through	the	Master	Farmer	programme,	there	were	distinct	limits	to	which	people	in	and	
around	 the	 village	 could	 press	 ‘declarations	 of	 dependence’	 on	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three.	When	 his	
elder	brother	Pondani	died	 in	the	 late	1970s,	Chimtengo	Three	claimed	a	 large	portion	of	his	elder	
brother’s	wealth	during	discussions	about	inheritance	at	Pondani’s	funeral.	Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	
claim	angered	Pondani’s	son	Aleke,	but	because	of	the	Chief’s	strong	position	there	was	little	Aleke	
could	do.	Aleke	moved	away	from	the	village	to	a	nearby	trading	centre	and	the	sides	of	the	family	
remained	estranged	for	a	long	time10.	People	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	told	me	that	some	people	had,	
like	Aleke,	 resented	Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	wealth.	Harold	Kaso	 said	 that	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	
had	nonetheless	 ‘just	 gone	ahead,	working	hard’.	 People	 like	Aleke	 that	 left	 the	 village	were	 soon	
replaced	 with	 new	 arrivals.	 As	 a	 result	 the	 village	 continued	 to	 grow	 in	 size	 under	 his	 leadership	
through	the	1980s.		
	
Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	ability	to	just	‘go	ahead’	was	in	large	part	due	to	the	political	and	economic	
context	 in	 Malawi	 at	 that	 time.	 President	 Kamuzu	 Banda	 and	 his	 government	 had	 made	 few	
fundamental	changes	to	the	Malawian	economy	following	independence	from	Britain.	Alterations	did	
begin	to	take	place	in	the	1970s,	migrant	labour	abroad	was	curtailed	and	subsidies	and	supports	for	
smallholders	 were	 removed	 (Chirwa,	 1996,	 Kydd	 and	 Christiansen,	 1982).	 These	 changes	 had	 the	
effect	of	 forcing	more	Malawians	 into	 labour	on	Malawi’s	estates	and	plantations,	which	had	been	
taken	over	by	Banda	and	 the	 government.	 The	pay	 for	 labourers	on	 these	holdings	was	 very	poor	
compared	to	that	which	had	been	available	to	them	abroad	and	only	worsened	following	the	global	
oil	price	crash	 in	the	 late	1970s	(Chirwa,	1996).	While	subsidies	for	most	smallholders	were	ended,	
Banda	did	continue	to	support	Master	Farmers	 like	Chimtengo	Three	(Cammack	et	al.	2010).	 In	the	
																																								 																				
10	The	shop	that	Aleke	started	with	what	inheritance	he	did	take	for	himself	was	still	running	when	I	came	to	
live	in	Chimtengo	and	it	was	there	that	Aleke’s	son,	Jimmy,	told	me	this	story.		
1970s	 the	Central	 Region	had	 the	highest	 ‘peasant	producer’	 incomes	 in	 the	 country,	 but	 also	 the	
greatest	inequality	(Potts,	1985	p.	187,	McCracken,	2012	p.	4,	Kydd	and	Christiansen,	1982).	Banda’s	
continuing	support	for	a	small	rural	elite	through	the	1980s	only	compounded	this	disparity.	
	
For	people	in	living	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	the	paucity	of	livelihood	options	available	during	the	latter	
part	of	Banda’s	time	in	power	meant	working	for	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	and	declaring	dependence	
on	him	was	the	best	option.	Even	where	people	like	Aleke	felt	the	kind	of	inequalities	of	distribution	
that	 Chimtengo	 Three’s	 chieftaincy	 enlarged	 were	 immoral,	 the	 economic	 context	 of	 the	 period	
meant	there	were	always	more	people	ready	to	make	themselves	dependent	on	the	chief	than	there	
were	who	might	leave	him.		
	
Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	had	grown	up	in	the	village	under	Chief	Chimtengo	Three,	but	had	not	had	
the	 same	opportunities	 as	 the	 old	 Chief.	Unable	 to	work	 abroad,	 he	 took	 up	 poorly	 paid	work	 on	
commercial	 estates	 and	 on	 government	 development	 projects	 in	 the	 Central	 Region	 through	 the	
1980s.	It	was	while	he	was	working	on	a	road	in	Paskulu	near	Lilongwe	that	he	met	Doris,	whom	he	
married	and	brought	back	to	Chimtengo	to	start	a	home	and	begin	farming	there.	Chief	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	remembered	life	in	the	village	under	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	fondly;	there	had	been	lots	of	
fertiliser	 available	 in	 the	 village	 at	 the	 time,	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three’s	 position	 as	 a	Master	 Farmer	
allowing	 him	not	 just	 to	 provide	 villagers	with	 piecework,	 but	 also	with	 fertiliser	 and	 other	 inputs	
with	which	 they	 could	 farm	effectively	 for	 themselves.	However,	 as	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	was	
not	part	of	the	same	lineage	as	the	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	he	did	not	benefit	from	his	prosperity	as	
much	as	others	in	the	village	and	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	family	remained	relatively	poor.	Chief	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	distance	from	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	meant	was	not	he	able	to	stake	a	claim	
on	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three’s	 inheritance	 when	 he	 died	 in	 2007.	 He	 and	 other	 villagers	 I	 spoke	 to	
agreed	that	it	was	because	of	David	and	Harold’s	close	connection	to	the	chief	that	they	received	a	
share	of	Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	assets,	although	much	of	the	 inheritance	went	to	relatives	of	the	
Chief	who	lived	away	from	the	village11.		
	
It	was,	though,	precisely	because	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	belonged	to	a	different	lineage	to	the	old	chief	
that	 he	 became	 village	 chief	 himself.	 David	 described	 to	me	 how	 the	 elders	 of	 Chimtengo	met	 to	
discuss	 (-kambirana)	 the	 succession	 on	 the	 day	 of	 Chimtengo	 Three’s	 funeral,	 in	 keeping	 with	
‘tradition’	 (mwambo).	 They	 decided	 that	 it	 would	 be	 ‘doing	 justly’	 (-chita	 chilungamo)	 for	 the	
chieftaincy	to	move	to	another	family	in	the	village,	other	than	Chimtengo	Three’s,	and	with	this	 in	
mind	 selected	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo.	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 said	 he	 had	 been	 extremely	 reluctant	 to	
become	 chief,	 barring	 himself	 in	 his	 house	 when	 he	 was	 asked	 to	 come	 to	 see	 the	 elders,	 only	
agreeing	 to	 take	 the	 chieftaincy	 after	 some	 hours;	 ‘I	 refused	 vehemently’	 he	 told	 me.	 When	 he	
explained	his	reluctance	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	made	the	same	complaints	about	the	‘work’	involved	in	
chieftaincy	 that	 he	 did	 on	 other	 occasions.	 But	 he	 also	 cited	 events	 that	 took	 place	 around	 his	
entrance	into	the	chieftaincy	as	evidence	for	his	claims	about	the	ambivalence	of	the	position.			
	
Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 members	 of	 the	 village	 told	 me	 that	 even	 as	 the	 discussions	 about	 the	
direction	 of	 the	 chieftaincy	 had	 been	 taking	 place	 amongst	 the	 elders	 a	 villager	 named	 Kadango	
Msaka	had	come	to	the	elders	with	half	a	dozen	other	men	and	women	saying	that	they	would	not	
accept	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	as	their	chief.	Although	they	argued	and	negotiated,	there	was	not	much	
the	elders	could	do	about	Msaka’s	faction	forming	a	new	village	and	declaring	him	a	chief.	A	month	
after	Chimtengo	Three’s	 funeral	another	group	declared	a	new	chief	 for	themselves	as	well,	a	man	
name	Grimson	 Sauka.	Unbeknown	 to	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 the	 village	 elders,	 both	 these	
factions	had	courted	the	support	of	other	local	chiefs	in	their	bids	to	form	separate	villages.	Harold	
Kaso	and	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	 told	me	 that	 these	village	Village	Heads	had	been	amongst	 those	
who	had	been	‘jealous’	of	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	in	his	heyday,	but	had	been	unable	to	do	much	to	
																																								 																				
11	Neither	David	nor	Harold	were	close	relatives	of	Chimtengo	Three	but	they	and	everyone	else	in	the	village	
emphasised	the	strong	affective	connection	they	had	built	with	the	old	chief.	Chimtengo	Three’s	own	children	
had	moved	away	from	the	village	during	the	1990s	and,	according	to	people	I	spoke	to	in	the	area,	rarely	came	
back	to	help	him.	Their	claim	as	children	was	nonetheless	strong	enough	to	get	a	share	of	the	inheritance	and	
take	it	from	the	village.		
		
limit	his	success	because	of	the	wealth	he	had	established	through	his	connection	 into	the	migrant	
labour	economy	and	the	Master	Farmer	programme.		
	
The	chiefs	helped	Msaka	and	Sauka’s	factions	get	recognition	from	the	local	Group	Village	Heads	and	
the	 Traditional	 Authority.	 With	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 gone,	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 and	 the	
villagers	who	stayed	with	him	 found	 they	did	not	have	enough	 resources	or	 influence	 to	get	other	
local	chiefs	to	side	with	them.	Kadango	Msaka	became	Chief	Chimtengo	Kutsidya,	whilst	the	leader	of	
the	 second	 faction,	 Grimson	 Sauka,	 became	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kunjira.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 division	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo	became	chief	of	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	rather	than	Chief	Chimtengo	Four,	
of	Chimtengo	village.		
	
FISP	 was	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 explanations	 I	 was	 given	 for	 the	 break	 up	 of	 Chimtengo	 village.	
Unsurprisingly	 the	moral	 valence	 people	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 ascribed	 to	 Kunjira	 and	 Kutsidya’s	
actions	was	different	 to	 the	one	 the	chiefs	offered	me	 themselves.	When	 I	asked	Chief	Chimtengo	
Kubwalo	 about	 the	 division	 he	 said,	 ‘They	 [Kutsidya	 and	 Kunjira]	 were	 causing	 trouble	 over	 the	
fertiliser,	 they	 thought	 that	 they	would	 get	more	 if	 they	had	 their	 own	 villages.’	David	meanwhile	
said	 that	 they	 had	 been	 able	 to	 persuade	 other	 chiefs	 to	 support	 them	 by	 promising	 to	 ‘share	
fertiliser’	with	them.	Chimtengo	Three,	David	and	other	people	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	spoke	of	the	
‘greed’	 (umbombo)	 of	 Kutsidya	 and	 Kunjira.	 When	 I	 asked	 them	 why	 they	 had	 broken	 with	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo	both	chiefs	 said	 they	had	wanted	 to	 ‘get	 fertiliser’.	They	did	not	however	 feel	
that	they	had	been	greedy,	but	rather	had	reasonable	concerns	about	the	distribution	of	resources	in	
the	 village,	 given	 the	 size	 to	 which	 it	 had	 grown	 to	 under	 Chimtengo	 Three,	 and	 Chimtengo	
Kubwalo’s	poverty	relative	to	the	old	chief;	‘Chimtengo	[village]	was	too	big’,	Kunjira	explained,	‘we	
wanted	to	control	fertiliser	ourselves’.		
	
There	was	 little	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 or	 the	 village	 elders	 could	 do	 about	 the	 division	 of	 the	
village	because	of	the	structure	of	the	FISP	programme,	and	the	turn	local	and	national	politics	had	
taken	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Kamuzu	 Banda’s	 personal	 idiosyncrasies	 and	 caprice	 notwithstanding,	
dependence	on	him,	and	senior	officials,	chiefs	and	Master	Farmers	supported	by	him,	had	been	the	
only	 way	 of	 assuring	 security	 and	 prosperity	 during	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 his	 rule	 (van	 Donge	 1995,	
Cammack	 2010,	 2011).	 On-going	 donor	 support	 secured	 Banda’s	 position	 even	 as	 the	 Malawian	
economy	 had	 atrophied	 through	 1980s.	 After	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 however	 donor	 priorities	
changed,	a	 focus	on	human	 rights	and	 liberalism	creating	new	political	 conditions	 that	allowed	 for	
Malawians	to	press	their	discontentment	with	political	and	economic	conditions	in	Malawi.	 In	1994	
Bakili	Muluzi	 replaced	 Banda	 after	winning	 the	 first	 elections	 to	 take	 place	 in	 the	 country	 in	 over	
thirty	years	(Resnick	2013,	Cammack	2010,	van	Donge	1995).		
	
Muluzi	and	his	successors	to	the	Presidency	repeatedly	 found	their	attempts	to	concentrate	power	
and	 extend	 personal	 control	 limited	 by	 some	 of	 the	 same	 conditions	 that	 contributed	 to	 Banda’s	
downfall	 in	1994	 (Resnick	2013,	Cammack	2010,	2011).	Bingu	wa	Mutharika	 introduced	the	FISP	 in	
2005	after	Bakili	Muluzi	had	abolished	the	Master	Farmer	Programme	and	other	 remaining	Banda-
era	 subsidies	 at	 the	 start	 of	 his	 time	 in	 power.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 the	Mutharika	 government	
subsequently	 used	 FISP	 fertiliser	 to	 influence	 the	 2009	 elections	 in	 its	 favour,	 but	 it	 is	 unclear	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 it	 could	 have	 influenced	 voting	 at	 the	 local	 level	 (Brazys	 et	 al	 2015,	 Dionne	 and	
Horowitz	2016).	Mutharika’s	promotion	of	 chiefs	 in	 so-called	 ‘podium	elevations’	 (Englund	2012	p.	
73-74,	 Eggen	 2011	 p.	 327)	 and	 his	 prevarication	 over	 holding	 local	 government	 elections	 can	 be	
interpreted	 as	 attempts	 to	 extend	 control	 of	 Malawian	 politics,	 through	 using	 the	 hierarchy	 of	
traditional	 authority	 (Cammack	 2011)12.	 Donors	 certainly	 viewed	Mutharika’s	 actions	 as	means	 to	
personalise	 the	 government,	 and	 responded	 by	 suspending	 aid	 in	 2011	 (Cammck	 2011).	 The	
curtailment	of	budgetary	support,	a	 significant	proportion	of	which	was	used	 to	 fund	 the	FISP,	 left	
Mutharika,	and	those	who	relied	on	him,	in	a	vulnerable	position	(Resnick	2013	p.	125-126,	132).		
	
																																								 																				
12	As	there	absence	from	the	article	suggests,	in	fifteen	months	of	living	in	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	I	heard	no	
mention	of	any	local	government	representative,	or	council	in	the	village.	All	discussion	of	local	politics	was	
centered	on	chiefs,	and	other	kinds	of	‘big	men’.		
The	case	of	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	suggests	that	in	this	broader	political	and	economic	context	
the	FISP	can	provide	a	way	for	rural	Malawians	to	press	claims	with	their	Village	Heads,	at	the	very	
bottom	of	Malawi’s	chiefly	hierarchy.	While	FISP	fertiliser	many	not	be	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	
the	poorest,	 this	does	not	necessarily	mean	 that	 the	poor	have	no	 influence	over	 the	distribution.	
Chief	Chimtengo	Three	had	‘just	gone	ahead’,	accumulating	and	distributing	resources	in	the	face	of	
complaints	about	the	morality	of	his	actions	from	people	like	Aleke.	The	paucity	of	economic	options	
for	people	in	the	area,	particularly	from	the	end	of	the	1970s,	relative	to	what	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	
could	offer	as	one	of	Banda’s	Master	Farmers,	meant	that	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	could	be	assured	of	
having	 more	 people	 declaring	 dependence	 upon	 him	 as	 chief	 than	 leaving	 him.	 The	 rather	 more	
unpredictable	and	fluid	nature	of	political	dependencies	in	the	multi-party	era	means	that	chiefs	and	
government	 officials	 are	 in	 greater	 competition	 for	 supporters	 than	 they	 were	 under	 Banda	
(Cammack	et	 al	 2010,	Cammack	2011).	Research	on	 chiefs	 in	Malawi,	 and	 the	history	 I	 have	given	
here	shows	the	existence	of	this	kind	of	competition	has	been	vital	to	the	ability	of	people	to	press	
claims	with	their	chiefs	(Swidler	2013).			
	
Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	nervousness	over	what	he	had	done	with	Yamikani’s	coupon	is	
understandable	in	the	light	of	the	events	that	followed	his	appointment	as	chief.	A	lack	of	
opportunities	in	the	past,	coupled	with	contemporary	political	and	economic	conditions	in	Malawi,	
meant	that	he	was	dependent	upon	the	people	in	his	village	to	maintain	his	position,	and	the	modest	
benefits	he	could	derive	from	it.	If	he	failed	to	distribute	FISP	inputs	and	other	resources	in	a	way	
deemed	morally	acceptable,	the	programme	provided	the	resources	through	which	people	could	
establish	new	relationships	of	dependence	and	support	under	new	village	chiefs.	Chimtengo	
Kutsidya’s	complaint	at	the	hearing	over	Esnarth’s	coupon	suggested	though	that	the	share	village	
heads	could	take	for	themselves,	and	the	other	benefits	associated	with	being	chief	were	perhaps	
not	always	worth	the	work.	If	Chitmengo	Kutsidya	really	had	been	being	‘greedy’,	hoping	that	he	
would	have	been	able	to	obtain	a	significant	amount	of	FISP	fertiliser	for	himself	through	starting	a	
new	village,	then	those	ambitions	were	being	frustrated.	The	same	conditions	that	had	enabled	
Chimtengo	Kutsidya	to	break	away	from	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	in	2007,	were	also	those	that	enabled	
Esnarth	to	press	her	claim	on	him	in	2012.	
	
5	 	Conclusion	
I	 began	 this	 article	 responding	 to	 James	 Ferguson’s	 (2015,	 2013)	 call	 that	 researchers	 pay	 close	
attention	 to	 the	way	 in	which	people	are	making	 claims	on	 resources	 in	 Southern	Africa	 at	 a	 time	
when	there	labour	is	increasingly	not	valued.	I	have	argued	that	understanding	chieftaincy	is	crucial	
to	understanding	the	politics	of	distribution	and	inequality	in	contemporary	Malawi.	The	literature	on	
chieftaincy	in	Malawi	highlights	the	involvement	of	chiefs	in	the	state	but	also	raises	questions	about	
Mamdani’s	(1996)	assertion	that	chiefs	in	Africa	are	‘despots’,	unresponsive	to	the	demands	of	their	
people.	The	case	of	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	village	suggests	that	the	benefits	Village	Heads	derive	from	
their	position,	including	the	larger	shares	of	resources	they	may	take	from	programmes	like	FISP,	are	
justified	 only	 because	 of	 the	 distributional	work	 they	 do,	work	 acknowledged	 as	 valuable	 by	 their	
people.	Where	their	direction	of	resources	is	felt	to	be	unjust,	Village	Heads	face	losing	their	position,	
because	of	the	freedom	their	people	have	to	make	new	‘declarations	of	dependence’	on	new	Village	
Heads.	It	was	only	the	hard	work	that	he	had	to	do	mediating	the	distribution	-	all	the	‘going	around	
and	around’	-	that	justified	Chief	Chimtengo	Kubwalo’s	receipt	of	a	larger	share	of	the	village’s	FISP	
fertiliser.	His	inability	to	take	more	of	the	fertiliser	for	himself,	in	the	face	of	the	claims	of	his	people,	
was	made	apparent	when	he	took	some	of	Yamikani’s	share.		
	
The	nature	of	the	 ‘freedom’	that	the	 institution	of	chieftaincy	confers	on	poor	rural	Malawians	 like	
those	 living	 in	 Chimtengo	 Kubwalo	 village,	 and	 the	way	 the	 FISP	 plays	 into	 that	 freedom	 is	made	
clearer	against	the	backdrop	of	history.	Harri	Englund	(2012)	describes	the	way	villagers	celebrated	
the	 ‘freedom’	 (ufulu)	 they	 demonstrated	 when	 they	 selected	 a	 new	 Village	 Head	 for	 themselves,	
after	their	old	one	had	failed	to	distribute	FISP	fertiliser	in	a	way	that	they	felt	just.	There	was	more	
ambivalence	surrounding	the	division	of	Chimtengo	village	after	Chief	Chimtengo	Three’s	death.	It	is	
telling	that	Chimtengo	Kutsidya	and	Chimtengo	Kubwalo	only	broke	off	from	Chimtengo	village	when	
Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 died,	 rather	 than	 when	 FISP	 was	 first	 rolled	 out	 in	 2005.	 The	 resources	
		
available	through	FISP	were,	on	their	own,	not	so	great	as	to	make	leaving	Chief	Chimtengo	Three	a	
particularly	 attractive	 prospect.	 When	 I	 was	 doing	 my	 fieldwork	 in	 2012	 and	 2013	 villagers	 in	
Chimtengo	Kubwalo,	Chimtengo	Kutsidya	and	Chimtengo	Kunjira	had	greater	freedom	to	press	claims	
with	their	Village	Heads	than	they	had	done	under	Chief	Chimtengo	Three,	but	that	was	only	because	
their	new	Village	Heads	were	poor,	rather	than	because	the	villagers	had	drastically	 improved	their	
own	positions.	Equality	had	grown,	but	as	a	consequence	of	impoverishment.	Villagers	in	Chimtengo	
Kutsidya	and	Chimtengo	Kunjira	remembered	the	work	and	support	available	under	Chief	Chimtengo	
Three	as	fondly	as	the	villagers	that	had	split	from	in	Chimengo	Kubwalo;	the	old	Chief’s	death	and	
the	division	of	the	village	was	not	really	something	to	celebrate.		
	
If	not	‘despots’,	the	way	resources	like	FISP	have	been	distributed	in	Malawi,	down	the	hierarchy	of	
traditional	authority	from	central	government,	means	that	those	chiefs	higher	up	that	hierarchy	have	
faced	 little	 obligation	 to	 distribute	 resources	 to	 those	 below	 them.	 In	 certain	 cases	 even	 Village	
Heads	 like	 Chief	 Chimtengo	 Three	 may	 be	 able	 to	 ‘just	 go	 ahead’	 ignoring	 the	 petitions	 of	 their	
people,	 because	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 their	 connections	 outside	 of	 their	 villages.	 The	 conditions	 of	
contemporary	Malawian	politics	do	give	some	incentive	to	chiefs	at	all	levels	to	distribute	a	minimum	
of	resources	to	their	dependents.	However,	until	options	to	make	new	‘declarations	of	dependence’,	
away	 from	 the	 institution	 of	 chieftaincy,	 as	 they	 did	 when	 Southern	 Africa’s	 labour	 market	 first	
developed,	it	is	unlikely	that	chieftaincy	will	do	any	more	than	help	stave	off	‘asocial’	inequality	and	
keep	those	who	are	already	very	poor	from	being	cast	off	completely.		
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